

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSH ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3165

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 1884

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CENTO

SUBJECT: CENTO POLITICAL GUIDANCE PAPER (UK REDRAFT)

REFS: A) ANKARA 1772: B) ANKARA 1634

BEGIN SUMMARY: FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PROMISED UK EMB REDRAFT OF POLITICAL GUIDANCE PAPER (REFTELS). THIS REDRAFT HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO LONDON AND CONSTITUTES A PERSONAL VENTURE ON PART OF UK REP AT WORKING GROUP. ALTHOUGH IS IS NOT SATISFACTORY TO USG VIEWPOINT, IT NEVERTHELESS IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER SECRETARIAT DRAFT IN MANY RESPECTS. WE RECOMMEND THAT DEPARTMENT IN PREPARING GUIDANCE, AND US REP HERE IN WORKING GROUP, CONCENTRATE EFFORTS ON SECTION DEALING WITH DIRECTIVES FOR MILITARY PLANNING. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLING IS UK REP'S PERSONAL REDRAFT OF POLITICAL GUIDANCE PAPER PROMISED DURING LAST WORKING GROUP MEETING ON THIS SUBJECT (REFTELS):

BEGIN TEXT

INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH AS IN SECRETARIAT PAPER.

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THE THREAT IN THE CENTO REGION

1. THE MAIN THREAT TO THE AREA AND TO THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF CENTO MEMBER COUNTRIES COMES FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THE USSR AIMS EVENTUALLY TO ESTABLISH HERSELF AS A DOMINANT MAJOR POWER IN THE AREA BY UNDERMINING AND DISPLACING OTHER INFLUENCES BY THE COORDINATED USE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SUBVERSIVE AND MILITARY MEANS.

SOVIET POLICY

POLITICAL MEANS

2. THE SOVIET UNION AIMS TO INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE BY EXPANDING "GOOD" ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE STATES IN THE REGION. IT ALSO AIMS TO PROMOTE THE ACQUISITION OF POWER BY GOVERNMENTS SERVING THE AIMS OF SOVIET POLICY AND TO WEAKEN THOSE THAT DO NOT.

3. THE SOVIET UNION TRIES TO EXPLOIT SITUATIONS ARISING FROM THE AIMS OF SOME REGIONAL NON-CENTO COUNTRIES IN THE AREA AND THEIR DISPUTES WITH REGIONAL MEMBERS OF CENTO. IN THE CASE OF ANOTHER CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT FOLLOW THE SAME POLICY AS IN 1971 OF PROVIDING MORAL, DIPLOMATIC AND MATERIAL, BUT NOT DIRECT OPERATIONAL, SUPPORT TO INDIA. IT MIGHT ALSO EXTEND SIMILAR SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN.

4. THE SOVIET UNION SEEKS TO EXPLOIT DIFFERENCES CENTO MEMBER COUNTRIES MAY HAVE WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS BY UTILIZING AND SUPPORTING THE LATTER. IN THE CASE OF TURKEY THE SOVIET UNION HAS DEVELOPED POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE ON TURKEY'S SOUTHERN FLANK IN SYRIA AND IRAQ.

5. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN ADVOCATING THE SPIRIT OF DETENTE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST SOME OF THEIR RECENT ACTIONS SHOW THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO TAKE RISKS WITH THIS IF THEY REGARD THIS AS NECESSARY TO FURTHER THEIR INTERESTS.

ECONOMIC MEANS

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6. THE SOVIET UNION SEEKS TO ACQUIRE A SAY IN THE DISPOSAL OF NATURAL, AND IN PARTICULAR ENERGY, RESOURCES IN THE AREA. THEY DEVELOP TRADE AND PROVIDE GENERAL ECONOMIC AS WELL AS MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES IN THE AREA IN SUPPORT OF THEIR POLITICAL AIMS, PAYING PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE NEIGHBORS OF CENTO REGIONAL MEMBERS.

MILITARY MEANS

7. THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THEIR ALLIES ARE STEADILY INCREASING IN TERMS OF MODERN AIR, LAND AND SEA WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINS NAVAL FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND AIMS TO HAVE UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO THE WARM WATERS AROUND THE CENTO REGION.

8. SOVIET MILITARY ACTION BY LAND AND AIR COULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITH SOVIET FORCES STATIONED IN THE TRANS-CAUCASUS, THE NORTH CAUCASUS AND TURKISTAN MILITARY DISTRICTS. THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT ALSO HOPE TO USE THE TERRITORIES OF SOME COUNTRIES ADJACENT TO REGIONAL MEMBER COUNTRIES FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THEM, E.G., AFGHANISTAN'S TERRITORY MIGHT PRESENT FACILITIES FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST IRAN AND PAKISTAN.

9. THE USE OF THESE SOVIET FORCES MENTIONED ABOVE WOULD HOWEVER BE AT THE EXPENSE OF RESERVES OR FORCES ALREADY DEPLOYED FACING NATO AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. THE SOVIETS ARE HOWEVER NOT LIKELY TO STRENGTHEN THEIR FORCES IN THE SOUTH AT THE EXPENSE OF THEIR VIGILANCE IN THE EAST OR IN THE WEST.

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ACTION NEA-12

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10. IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL DELIBERATELY INITIATE WAR (GENERAL OR LIMITED) IN THE CENTO AREA OR

ENGAGE IN OPEN ATTACK ON ANY OF THE REGIONAL COUNTRIES, SINCE THIS COULD INVOLVE SERIOUS RISK OF A GENERAL WAR WITH A CONSEQUENT DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR. THOUGH SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE EVENT OF POLITICAL UNREST IN ONE OF THE REGIONAL COUNTRIES IS UNLIKELY UNDER FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT CANNOT BE RULED OUT COMPLETELY.

11. IN THE EVENT OF WAR, HOWEVER INITIATED, THE SOVIET ACTIONS MIGHT TAKE THE FORM OF:

(A) A GENERAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST NATO AND CENTO SIMULTANEOUSLY;

(B) AN ATTACK ON ONE OR ALL OF THE THREE REGIONAL COUNTRIES.

SUBVERSIVE MEANS

12. IN THE REALIZATION OF THE RISKS OF GENERAL WAR DESCRIBED ABOVE, THE SOVIET HAVE ADOPTED AN INDIRECT AND SUBVERSIVE STRATEGY TO UNDERMINE THE CENTO ALLIANCE AND TO OUT-FLANK THE REGIONAL MEMBER COUNTRIES. THE SOVIET UNION CONSEQUENTLY SUPPORTS SUBVERSION IN THE REGIONAL COUNTRIES AT THE SAME TIME AS PURSUING GOOD POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THEM. IN CALLS ATTENTION TO THEIR POLITICAL AND INTERNAL
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PROBLEMS IN THE HOPE OF INTENSIFYING AND EXACERBATING THEM. IN IRAN FOR EXAMPLE THE SOVIET UNION CAUTIOUSLY ENCOURAGES ANTI-REGIME ELEMENTS.

13. THE SOVIET UNION ALSO ENCOURAGES THE PROVISION OF SUPPORT BY THIRD COUNTRIES FOR SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS IN CENTO REGIONAL COUNTRIES, E.G., IRAQI SUPPORT FOR ELEMENTS IN IRAN AND PAKISTAN. IT GIVES MORAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT TO LOCAL PRO-MOSCOW ELEMENTS. IN THE EVENT OF POLITICAL UNREST IN ONE OF THE REGIONAL COUNTRIES THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT SUPPORT A LOCAL INSURRECTION BY CLANDESTINELY PROVIDING MATERIAL ASSISTANCE.

14. THREAT FROM COMMUNIST CHINA: AS IN SECRETARIAT PAPER.

DIRECTIVES FOR MILITARY PLANNING

15. IN VIEW OF THE ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE CENTO AREA SUMMARIZED ABOVE, THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING:

(I) THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF CENTO HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE SUCCESSFUL DETERRING OF DIRECT AGGRESSION BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LATTER'S THREAT TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF CENTO REGIONAL MEMBERS. MILITARY PLANNING THEREFORE SHOULD CONSIDER THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS DETERRENT.

(II) THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SHOULD DIRECT THEIR ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR CONTINUED VIGILANCE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A FULL AND CORRECT ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SIZE AND DISPOSITION OF THE SOVIET THREAT TO THE REGION.

(III) BECAUSE OF THE COMPARATIVELY LOW RISK OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE EMPHASIS PUT BY THE SOVIET UNION ON INDIRECT AND SUBVERSIVE METHODS, THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SHOULD PAY THE CLOSEST ATTENTION TO COUNTERING THE INCREASED SOVIET ENCOURAGEMENT OF SUBVERSION IN THE CENTO AREA. END TEXT.

2. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THIS REDRAFT WILL NOT BE SATISFACTORY TO THE USG IN SEVERAL RESPECTS, IT CONSTITUTES AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE SECRETARIAT DRAFT (REF B). IT IS HELPFUL IN LIMITING THE DAMAGE PROJECTED IN
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THE ORIGINAL DRAFT DIRECTIVES FOR MILITARY PLANNING, WHILE STILL MAKING A GESTURE TOWARDS THE VIEWS OF CERTAIN REGIONAL CENTO MEMBERS. IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE BEST TACTIC FOR US TO PURSUE -- BOTH WHILE PREPARING GUIDANCE IN THE DEPARTMENT AND IN NEGOTIATING IN ANKARA DURING THE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS -- IS TO FOCUS MOST ATTENTION ON THE SECTION DEALING WITH DIRECTIVES FOR MILITARY PLANNING. TO SOME DEGREE WE CAN COUNT ON THE UK AND TURKISH REPS TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE IN THE PREAMBULAR SECTIONS, WITH ASSISTS FROM US.
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